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Abstract 
The music industry has repeatedly expressed concerns over potentially devastating 
impacts of online music sharing. Initial attempts to control online ﬁle sharing have 
been primarily through consumer education and legal action against the operators of 
networks that facilitated ﬁle sharing. Recent legal action against individual ﬁle sharers 
marked an unprecedented shift in the industry’s strategy. The focus now is on well-
publicized legal threats and actions on a relatively small group of individuals to 
discourage overall music ﬁle sharing. To determine the resulting impact of these legal 
threats, we passively tracked online ﬁle-sharing behavior of over 2,000 individuals. 
We found that individuals who share a substantial number of music ﬁles react to 
legal threats differently from those who share a lesser number of ﬁles. Importantly, 
our analysis indicates that even after these legal threats and the resulting lowered 
levels of ﬁle sharing, the availability of music ﬁles on these networks remains 
substantial. 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle-sharing technology has opened new 
channels for legitimate online distribution of digital products including re­
corded music. This has resulted in challenges and opportunities for entities 
involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of such digital 
goods (Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman 1999; Gopal, Bhattacharjee, and 
Sanders 2006). But this same technology also provides the means for unau­
thorized copying and distribution of such goods (Gopal and Sanders 1997; 
Gopal et al. 2004). The popularity and availability of online music ﬁle-sharing 
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networks has attracted the interests of diverse groups including the music 
industry, consumers, artists, the popular press, and government legislative 
bodies. 
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the trade group 
that represents the U.S. recording industry,1 has repeatedly expressed concern 
over music-sharing activities. Claiming that the impact of online music piracy 
on its business has been “devastating” (Feuilherade 2004), the music industry 
has called for greater copyright enforcement and stronger regulations. In the 
past, RIAA has issued threats aimed only at the “operators” of P2P networks 
(Harmon 2003). In 2000, RIAA sued and successfully shut down Napster, 
one of the ﬁrst P2P ﬁle-sharing networks that facilitated digital music sharing. 
But the popularity of music sharing, instead of being dampened by the forced 
closure of Napster, was reinvigorated by the advent of several second-
generation P2P networks, the so-called Sons of Napster. The new networks 
do not maintain a central directory of ﬁles like Napster did, hence they have 
avoided legal repercussions from appearing to aid illegal ﬁle sharing.2 Con­
sequently, these networks act as decentralized peer groups, where individual 
ﬁle sharers act as both ﬁle and information repositories. Among these net­
works, Kazaa, launched in March 2001, appears to be currently the most 
popular, with over 60 million subscribers (Kazaa.com 2004). 
In response to this “epidemic of illegal ﬁle sharing” (RIAA 2003a), on 
June 26, 2003, RIAA redirected legal threats toward individual subscribers 
of these networks who, in the past, enjoyed anonymity in P2P environments. 
Prior to RIAA’s recent legal efforts, individual ﬁle sharers were almost com­
pletely immune from legal liability when violating copyright law. These 
recent legal developments have considerably altered that perceived notion 
(Graham 2003; Lichtman 2003). Owing to the impracticality of ﬁling lawsuits 
against every individual ﬁle sharer, RIAA has chosen to focus on a relatively 
small group of individuals and maximize the publicity surrounding its legal 
action to discourage the overall participation in ﬁle-sharing networks. 
But how did music sharers actually react to these legal threats? To date, 
we have anecdotal evidence provided by two very popular sharing sites, 
Kazaa and Grokster, but little detailed or speciﬁc information. For example, 
Kazaa and Grokster indicated that trafﬁc on June 26, 2003, after the threat 
did not decrease signiﬁcantly. With an average of 4 million users at any time, 
Kazaa reported 4.2 million users around 5:30 p.m. on June 26 (post threat). 
Similarly, Grokster reported 3.8 million users at 6:00 p.m. (normal range, 
3.5–4.5 million users) (Manuse 2003). Without access to detailed real data, 
1 The four major music companies are Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, Sony-
BMG. and EMI. 
2 The very recent Supreme Court holding in the Grokster case suggests that peer-to-peer 
(P2P) operators must take care. Currie (2005) suggests that P2P operators must “not induce 
copyright infringement” and must make sure “that there is a non-infringing use for the software” 
such as sharing photos or personally developed software. 
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there is little to conﬁrm or refute the claims of interested parties such as 
RIAA and the music industry or Kazaa and Grokster. Other research studies 
(for example, a recent Pew Survey) have relied on surveys of private indi­
viduals in an effort to gauge an individual’s piracy activity (Wingﬁeld 2004, 
p. B4). But this involves asking individuals to report, however assuredly 
“anonymously,” on their own illegal activity. Wingﬁeld (2004, p. B1) noted, 
“The Pew survey relies on consumers honestly reporting their online habits; 
some users may be less likely to admit they are downloading music owing 
to negative publicity surrounding ﬁle-sharing.” 
We began our work by asking whether we could track actual individual 
behavior and identify what actually was happening following legal threats. 
Because ﬁle sharing occurs on the Internet, it is possible to gather relevant 
data in real time. Acting solely as an observer and not as a participant, it is 
possible to track an individual’s ﬁle-sharing behavior across time and analyze 
any potential behavioral shifts surrounding major events. To accomplish this, 
we developed innovative data observation and capturing processes that di­
rectly measure the online P2P ﬁle-sharing activity of individuals. In effect, 
these tools act as proverbial “ﬂies on the wall,” silently observing ﬁle-sharing 
behavior (Bhattacharjee et al., in press). 
Our analysis provides before-and-after scrutiny of individual ﬁle-sharing 
behavior for the time frame during which four important events unfolded. 
These events are (1) the RIAA threats of legal action, (2) the initiation of 
legal actions, (3) a legal setback to RIAA, and (4) a reiteration by RIAA of 
continuing legal actions. All these events were widely reported by both 
popular media (Mainelli 2003). The research hypotheses, drawn from the 
theory of consumer utility maximization, provide the basic foundation to 
address the research questions. While we observe individual behavior that 
is consistent with utility theory, we also observe stark behavioral differences 
in P2P patterns (sharing ﬁles versus being online) and across groups (those 
sharing large versus small numbers of ﬁles). Finally, despite RIAA’s efforts 
to the contrary and despite a general reduction in individual sharing, op­
portunities for anyone seeking to download music ﬁles continue to be abun­
dant. The current study represents an early exploration of individual behav­
ioral research at a general observation stage that can then lead to formal 
theory formulation (see Smith 1976, 1982, 1985; Hoffman et al. 1987; Hoff­
man, Marsden, and Whinston 1990) of online music sharing. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A brief description 
of the four events studied is presented in Section II, followed by a theory 
framework and hypotheses in Section III. The data collection details are 
covered in Section IV. Empirical results are discussed in Section V, which 
includes the overall impact of the events, a detailed analysis of different 
types of sharers, and a discussion of the overall impact on ﬁle-sharing op­
portunities following these legal actions. We conclude the paper in Section 
VI with a summary of ﬁndings and future research directions. 
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II. Description of Events Studied 
A. Event 1: Announcement of Intention to Pursue
 
Legal Actions (June 26, 2003)
 
On June 25, RIAA announced for the ﬁrst time that it would pursue legal 
action against individual participants of P2P ﬁle-sharing networks. On June 
26, it was widely reported in the media that RIAA would “spend the next 
month identifying users who offer a signiﬁcant number of songs for others 
to copy on ﬁle-sharing networks in the United States and will target those 
individuals with lawsuits” (Zeidler 2003). A Seattle Times article reported 
by the Associated Press dated June 26, 2003, stated, “The embattled music 
industry disclosed aggressive plans today for an unprecedented escalation in 
its ﬁght against Internet piracy, threatening to sue hundreds of individual 
computer users who illegally share music ﬁles online” (Bridis 2003). Prior 
to this announcement, no individual ﬁle sharer had been held accountable 
for his participation on P2P networks. This announcement signaled a marked 
shift in RIAA’s policy, increasing an individual sharer’s risk of getting caught 
and prosecuted for sharing unauthorized music ﬁles. 
B. Event 2: Lawsuits Filed against Alleged Music File Sharers 
(September 8, 2003) 
After 2 months of evidence gathering, RIAA ﬁled lawsuits against 261 
alleged music sharers on September 8, 2003. Although P2P network admin­
istrators do not require users to reveal their true identities, computer terminals 
of P2P sharers can be identiﬁed by their IP addresses. In order to facilitate 
its lawsuits against individual P2P sharers, RIAA ﬁled for subpoenas using 
provisions under the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act to force Internet 
service providers to reveal “the names of suspected copyright infringers” 
through their IP addresses (Gross 2003). As a result, RIAA was able to 
identify the alleged ﬁle sharers through their Internet service providers. Ac­
cording to RIAA, the defendants of the lawsuits “have been illegally dis­
tributing substantial amounts (averaging more than 1,000 copyrighted music 
ﬁles each) of copyrighted music on peer-to-peer networks” (RIAA 2003b). 
Although most people associate music piracy with teenagers and college 
students, the wide range of people named in the lawsuits included a preteen, 
an elderly grandparent, and several parents who claimed to be completely 
unaware of their children’s online activities (Ahrens 2003). 
C. Event 3: Court Ruling against Revealing Identities of Sharers 
(December 19, 2003) 
In an ongoing legal dispute with RIAA, Verizon, a major Internet service 
provider, ﬁled an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals on the lower court 
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decision that permitted RIAA to obtain the names of the 261 music sharers 
for its September 8, 2003, lawsuits. On December 19, 2003, the appeals court 
argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, passed in 1998, does not 
directly address P2P ﬁle trading and overturned the lower court’s decision 
(Enders 2003). This decision denied RIAA’s unconventional use of subpoenas 
and, in effect, allowed Internet service providers to reject RIAA’s request 
for the identities of P2P sharers. Although RIAA could still proceed with 
lawsuits by naming IP addresses as defendants, it would have to go through 
a rather lengthy litigation process during which the defendants would be 
eventually identiﬁed during the court proceeding (McCullagh 2003). In spite 
of RIAA’s plan to proceed with this new form of lawsuit, it was expected 
that the increased legal cost would hinder RIAA’s ability to sue large numbers 
of ﬁle sharers (Ahrens 2004). 
D. Event 4: John Doe Lawsuits (January 21, 2004) 
After the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals, RIAA was no longer able 
to ﬁle a subpoena and obtain the names of online ﬁle sharers but still con­
tinued its data collection to monitor ﬁle-sharing activity. On January 21, 
2004, RIAA ﬁled additional lawsuits against 532 alleged ﬁle sharers, iden­
tiﬁed by their IP addresses (Roberts 2004). This new form of lawsuit, RIAA 
claimed, is “more intrusive” for individual ﬁle sharers (Borland 2003). In 
addition, without knowing the names of defendants, RIAA could no longer 
offer the opportunity to such individuals for private settlements outside of 
court litigation (Borland 2003). 
In the next section, we detail our basic utility maximization framework 
and set forth the two hypotheses that we study empirically related to the 
aforementioned legal actions. 
III. Utility Theory and Implicit Hypotheses 
Since the early pioneering work by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), 
research on the economics of illegitimate activities has widely employed a 
utility maximization approach to model individual decision making related 
to engaging in illegal activity. We employ a similar approach to draw our 
research hypotheses. Earlier works have also explicitly incorporated con­
straints on resources (either time or monetary) that dictate that an individual 
solve an allocation problem—how much (time) to devote to legal versus 
illegal activities. One key difference in the environment we study is that such 
constraints do not naturally exist with online ﬁle sharing—participation in 
legal and illegal activities can take place simultaneously and can occur at 
large quantitative levels. A music consumer can purchase or listen to digitized 
music on an authorized retailer’s Web site and, at the same time, participate 
in illegal ﬁle sharing of the same or other music. Thus, our hypotheses are 
developed from the consideration of cost and beneﬁt of engaging in online 
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ﬁle sharing. Further, the environment is in isolation from the constraints 
imposed by other external choices. 
Consider an individual consumer, i, whose computer has ni music ﬁles (or 
songs) stored and available for sharing. We focus on music sharing for mod­
eling purposes since RIAA’s legal measures are aimed speciﬁcally at indi­
viduals who share music ﬁles rather than those who download. Drawing from 
theories of altruism (Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996; Nordblom 1997; 
Rapoport 1997; Levine 2001), we assume that i’s beneﬁt from sharing his 
ﬁles with other consumers is tied directly to the number of individual songs, 
ni, that he makes available for others to download and the amount of time 
that he is connected to the P2P network, ti (and thus is available for sharing). 
Let Fi be the potential cost faced by individual i from the legal actions 
undertaken by RIAA. Thus, Fi represents the level of legal threat that is 
assumed to be nondecreasing with respect to the ampliﬁed threats and legal 
actions by RIAA to curb ﬁle sharing. We formulate a general utility function 
for individual i as Vi p Ui (ni , tiFFi ). We use ni * and t* i to indicate optimal 
choices for individual i for a given value of Fi; n* i and ti * are obtained by 
solving maxU (n , t FF ) with respect to n and t .i i i i i i 
An individual’s reaction to increased enforcement depends on the risk 
proﬁle of the individual. Economic studies on criminal behavior indicate that 
many individuals seem to prefer risk, which results in law enforcement ac­
tivities being less effective than expected (see, for example, Heineke 1978; 
Ehrlich 1973; Becker 1968; and Kolm 1973). Heineke (1978) and Ehrlich 
(1973) concluded that an increase in law enforcement efforts might cause 
risk-preferring individuals to increase their illegal activities. Similarly, an 
increase in penalty could also be shown to have the same effect (Ehrlich 
1973). 
The RIAA’s announcement and subsequent legal actions were clearly in­
tended to up the ante, to increase the perceived risk of being caught partic­
ipating in unauthorized music sharing (see Graham 2003). The RIAA’s ex­
pectations for the outcomes of its action in 2003 appeared to hinge on the 
assumption that the majority of the individuals are risk averse and rational. 
These observations lead us to posit the following formal hypotheses: 
Implicit RIAA Hypothesis 1 (reduced number of ﬁles shared): 
�n*/i �Fi ! 0 (an increase in the level of legal threat would reduce the number 
of music ﬁles being shared). 
Implicit RIAA Hypothesis 2 (reduced frequency of sharing): �t*/i �Fi ! 
0 (an increase in the level of legal threat would reduce the amount of time 
an individual spends on ﬁle-sharing networks). 
The formal test of hypotheses is conducted from observations on the shar­
ing behavior of over 2000 P2P subscribers of Kazaa, over the period of time 
during which the four events unfolded. The formal analysis can shed im­
portant insights on the differential impacts of legal threats on the patterns of 
sharing behavior (number of ﬁles shared versus time spent online). Such 
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analysis can also provide indirect evidence of the risk proﬁles of these sub­
scribers, that is, the proportions of P2P subscribers who are risk preferring, 
risk neutral, and risk averse. Further, we evaluate the hypotheses across two 
important subscriber groups: high-level (substantial) sharers and less active 
(nonsubstantial) sharers. This comparison is important since RIAA speciﬁ­
cally hinted that they were targeting the former group. Did this group react 
as RIAA intended? Did the nonsubstantial group feel less threatened and 
thus react differently? Overall, were the legal steps taken successful in de­
creasing music ﬁle sharing under a P2P environment? 
The automated data collection process we employed to garner the data 
provides us a unique vantage point to evaluate the hypotheses. The access 
to microlevel data enables us to directly test the hypotheses, without a need 
to make further behavioral assumptions that are often necessary when work­
ing with either macrolevel data or with survey data. The length of the data 
set utilized (spanning a year of observation on each individual) also adds 
temporal stability and robustness to our empirical ﬁndings. We begin the 
analysis by ﬁrst describing the sample selection and data gathering process. 
IV. Data 
We developed an automated process to passively track sharing information 
from over 2,000 sharers on Kazaa, the most popular P2P ﬁle-sharing network 
at the time (Graham 2003). The process operates in the background, taking 
snapshot observations of the ﬁle-sharing activities of P2P participants. As 
no direct contact was established with the monitored individuals, the process 
provided no reason for individuals to alter their ﬁle-sharing behavior. 
A. Sample Selection 
On the Kazaa network, a subscriber is identiﬁed through a user ID. Music 
ﬁles available on the network are categorized into genres (for example, al­
ternative, bluegrass, classical, country, easy listening, folk, hard rock, and 
hip hop). We began our data collection effort by conducting searches based 
on music genres over a period of 1 week to identify the music ﬁles in each 
genre3 and to capture the user ID associated with each music ﬁle. We selected 
over 6,000 subscribers (that is, 6,000 unique user IDs) who were on the 
network most frequently for the initial pool. We decided on this pool of most 
frequent sharers for three reasons: (1) More active sharers would be more 
likely to be found or observed on Kazaa; (2) with more active users and no 
new users, we sought to minimize any learning effects; with new sharers 
(new Kazaa subscribers joining during our sampling period) or novice users, 
3 In Kazaa, subscribers can conduct a search based on genre and obtain a list of ﬁles in 
these speciﬁc genres. 
98 the journal of law and economics 
TABLE 1 
Music Genres Tracked and Number of Associated Sharers 
Music Genre Unique Sharers Music Genre Unique Sharers 
Alternative 143 Latin 111 
Bluegrass 56 Pop 110 
Classical 93 Punk 93 
Country 74 Rap 104 
Easy Listening 231 R&B 141 
Folk 132 Rock 100 
Hard Rock 124 Soundtrack 116 
Hip Hop 107 Top 40 223 
Jazz 98 
Note.—There are 2,056 total sharers. 
learning effects might confound the results; and (3) more active sharers appear 
to be the type of individuals that RIAA intended to target. 
From this initial pool, we sought a sample that would be representative 
of the music genre mix. We ﬁrst examined the distribution across music 
genres of our sampling pool.4 From this distribution, it appeared that in order 
to obtain at least 50 sharers for bluegrass (the smallest stratum), we would 
need a total of about 2,000 in our overall sample.5 We continued to run 
searches and the random selection process until we obtained a minimum of 
50 sharers for each stratum. This resulted in 2,056 unique user IDs distributed 
as shown in Table 1. 
B. Data Capture 
After obtaining a sample of 2,056 user IDs, we initiated our data-capturing 
process as summarized in Table 2. Kazaa’s search engine provided no ability 
to search directly by user name or otherwise directly seek out a speciﬁc 
sharer. Instead, we had to develop an indirect search process to seek out each 
of our 2,056 individual sharers, a process we now detail. To obtain a balanced 
portfolio of sharers, we took care to randomly initiate our searches over each 
day’s 24 hours. We initiated searches at a random time on Monday of each 
week. The program begins by entering a randomly selected keyword iden­
tifying one category of music (for example, hard rock) and then conducts a 
search to determine if any of our identiﬁed user IDs are currently online at 
4 Since a sharer could be associated with ﬁles that belong to more than one music category, 
a sharer may be identiﬁed more than once from different search results. When purging any 
duplicate IDs, we assigned the individual to that category for which the individual had the 
highest percentage of ﬁles made available for sharing. 
5 One caveat is that the distribution of music categories naturally changes as sharers download 
new ﬁles, sign on and off, or clean up their hard drives. The distribution in our sample could 
be different from the actual current distribution on Kazaa. In addition, Kazaa does, from time 
to time, add some new music categories. 
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TABLE 2 
Six-Step Automated Data Capture Process 
Step Process 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Initiate a search process using a randomly selected music genre (country, hard rock, 
jazz, and so on) and obtain a list of music ﬁles identiﬁed with the genre 
Find a match between the user ID on the search result and the preselected list of 2,056 
sharers 
If a match is found, go to step 4; if a match is not found skip to step 6 
Activate Kazaa’s “Find More From Same User” function to obtain a list of shared ﬁles 
on the matched user’s computer 
Capture and convert the search result into a text ﬁle; ﬂag user ID so if found to be 
online again, hard drive is not searched again over the week; record each time user 
ID is found online; go to step 2 
If no more music genres are left to search, stop; else, initiate another search based on 
the next music genre; go to step 2 
Kazaa. If there is no match (that is, none of the preidentiﬁed sharers is 
currently online at Kazaa and available for sharing), our program randomly 
selects one of the remaining unsearched genres as the next keyword and 
repeats the search. If a match is found, the program explores the shared folder 
on the sharer’s hard drive. This shared folder is the ﬁle directory and sub­
directories designated by the individual as a shared resource available for 
download by other Kazaa users. The list of ﬁles in the shared folder is shown 
on the Kazaa search result screen, and our program captures and stores the 
list. After all matched user IDs from a category (music genre) search are 
fully exhausted, another randomly selected keyword (music genre) is entered 
and the search process continues. This process is repeated each day until the 
end of the week (Sunday). Once an individual sharer’s hard drive is scanned 
to obtain the shared list of music ﬁles, that individual’s hard drive is not 
explored again during the remainder of the week. However, we do record 
whether or not an individual is found online during each complete search 
process. 
C. Data Summary 
The formal data collection started on the week of March 3, 2003, over 3 
months prior to the ﬁrst legal event. For analysis purposes, we report on data 
collected until the week of March 1, 2004, a date some 5 weeks after the 
ﬁnal legal event. Table 3 shows the summary of the ﬁle-sharing activity 
during the ﬁrst 4 weeks of the monitoring period. We note a few additional 
facts about our observations during the ﬁrst 4 weeks of the monitoring period: 
72 of the individuals observed shared fewer than 10 music ﬁles, 350 of the 
individuals observed shared fewer than 50 music ﬁles, and 697 of the in­
dividuals observed shared fewer than 100 music ﬁles. 
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TABLE 3 
Initial Proﬁle of 2,056 Kazaa Sharers 
Number of audio ﬁles shared 
Number of times a sharer appeared per week 
Average 
216 
1.397 
Median 
140 
1.5 
Lowest 
1 
0 
Highest 
3,901 
7 
V. Empirical Analysis 
We conduct a formal test of the hypotheses following an event study 
approach. Event studies are commonly used in ﬁnancial and economic studies 
to evaluate the impact of signiﬁcant events (see, for example, MacKinlay 
1997; Peterson 1989). This approach has been applied widely, and speciﬁc 
applications include evaluating the impact of an earnings announcement on 
the stock price and studying the market reaction to environmental legislation 
(Blacconiere and Northcutt 1997), among others. One requirement for event 
study analysis to be appropriate is that the event or events were unanticipated. 
We conducted searches on Google and Yahoo search engines as well as 
Factiva for news stories prior to the actual announcement of each event. We 
found no indication of any related news stories preceding the actual an­
nouncements. We also monitored several technology related discussion fo­
rums (such as slashdot.org) and found no indication of pre-event public 
knowledge. Section VA presents the formal test statistic and results from the 
evaluation of the hypotheses using the overall data. Section VB presents a 
comparative analysis of two key sharer segments—those who share a large 
number of ﬁles (substantial sharers) and those who share fewer ﬁles (non-
substantial sharers). As the former group represents the main target of RIAA, 
this comparative analysis can provide useful insights on the overall success 
of the legal strategy. Finally, Section VC addresses the demand side of ﬁle-
sharing. Clearly, individuals share music ﬁles online in order to satisfy the 
demand by other users to download and acquire these ﬁles. We examine the 
demand side of the ﬁle-sharing equation by evaluating the opportunities to 
download music ﬁles, before and after the four legal events. This analysis 
provides another important perspective on the overall likelihood of success 
of the legal strategy employed by the music industry. 
A. Overall Impact of Events 
The statistical test to evaluate the impact of the four legal events was 
designed to accommodate two keys factors related to ﬁle sharing: (1) the 
ﬁle-sharing behavior (both frequency of being online and the number of ﬁles 
shared) between events was not static and exhibited a trend, and (2) the 
distribution for both measures of ﬁle-sharing behavior was asymmetric. To 
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TABLE 4 
Sign Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Each Event 
Z-Statistic for Z-Statistic for 
Number of Support for Frequency of Support for 
Event Files Shared Hypothesis 1 Being Online Hypothesis 2 
1. Initial announcement 43.325 (0) Not supported �17.161 (0) Supported 
2. Lawsuits ﬁled �28.135 (0) Supported �17.364 (0) Supported 
3. Identity roadblock 9.592 (0) Supported .140 (.4) Not supported 
4. John Doe lawsuits �8.861 (0) Supported �9.897 (0) Supported 
Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values. 
account for the former, we tested for changes in the trends of ﬁle-sharing 
behavior succeeding each legal event. We employed a nonparametric pro­
cedure to account for the latter (Cowan 1992; Sanger and Peterson 1990; 
Hite and Vetsuypens 1989; Doukas and Travlos 1988; Brown and Warner 
1980). The analysis was designed as follows. 
For each legal event, the week during which it was announced was des­
ignated as the event window. The pre-event and postevent windows were 
the 4 weeks before and after the event window, respectively. Trend shifts in 
two variables, the number of sharers who increased their frequency of being 
online and the number of sharers who increased the number of ﬁles they 
shared, were evaluated following each of the events. 
The sign test used in the analysis (see Cowan 1992) is a binomial test on 
the frequency of increased ﬁle-sharing activity. Under the null hypothesis, 
the proportion of sharers who exhibit increased activity has a binomial dis­
tribution with parameter pˆ. The sign test examines whether the proportion 
of sharers with increased activity is altered in the postevent period. Cowan 
(1992) reports that the test is well speciﬁed and powerful under a variety of 
conditions. The test statistic is 
w � npˆ 
Z p ,�npˆ(1 � pˆ) 
where n is the sample size and w is the number of sharers with increased 
activity in the postevent 4-week period. Two speciﬁcations of pˆ are commonly 
used. In one, pˆ is set to .5. Another speciﬁcation is based on the estimation 
of pˆ from the sample unaffected by the event. For the latter speciﬁcation, 
we estimate pˆ by splitting the 4-week pre-event period into two 2-week 
segments. The estimate of pˆ is the proportion of sharers who increased their 
activity from the initial 2-week segment to the latter 2-week segment. Overall, 
both estimations yielded consistent results, but, for brevity, we report only 
those with pˆp .5. 
The results, presented in Table 4, provide support for the two hypotheses 
for all cases except two: hypothesis 1 for event 1 and hypothesis 2 for event 
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TABLE 5
 
Changes in Frequency of Being Online and Files Shared,
 
by Number of Sharers
 
Increased Decreased 
Post event 1: 
Frequency of being online 609 1,143 
Number of audio ﬁles shared 1,490 299 
Post event 2: 
Frequency of being online 590 1,115 
Number of audio ﬁles shared 712 1,124 
Post event 3: 
Frequency of being online 926 701 
Number of audio ﬁles shared 1,059 641 
Post event 4: 
Frequency of being online 683 961 
Number of audio ﬁles shared 132 1,292 
3. While hypothesis 1 is not supported for event 1, the overall response to 
event 1 does indicate some degree of risk mitigation behavior on part of the 
ﬁle sharers. In response to the RIAA’s initial announcement to pursue law­
suits, even though the sharers increased their ﬁle-sharing levels, they did 
lower their frequency of being online. Note that hypothesis 1 is supported 
for event 3. Even though the number of ﬁles shared exhibited an upward 
trend, this event actually represents a setback for RIAA in its legal strategy. 
While the frequency of being online did not exhibit a concomitant statistically 
signiﬁcant increase in response to event 3, the frequency of usage levels did 
not drop. Table 5 presents summary data that indicate the number of sharers 
increasing or decreasing their number of ﬁles shared and their observed 
frequency of being online. The data in Table 5 are quite consistent with the 
ﬁndings discussed above. 
While the preceding analysis suggests that a signiﬁcant number of indi­
viduals altered their ﬁle-sharing behavior in response to legal threats from 
RIAA, the analysis does not indicate the magnitude of these shifts. Table 6 
reports the results from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether the 
magnitudes of ﬁle-sharing levels before and after each event are signiﬁcantly 
different. These results are consistent with the sign test and suggest that the 
number of ﬁles shared increased signiﬁcantly following events 1 and 3 and 
decreased signiﬁcantly following events 2 and 4. A categorical breakdown 
summarizing the magnitudes of changes following each event is presented 
in Table 7. The average and median ﬁle-sharing levels are reported in Table 
8. Despite increases following events 1 and 3, overall the average number 
of ﬁles shared by an individual dropped dramatically. This drop was most 
pronounced following legal event 4. 
Table 9 focuses on sharers found at least once in a 4-week period preceding 
and a 4-week period succeeding each of the four events. The results presented 
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TABLE 6 
Magnitude Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Each Event 
Z-Statistic for Number Support for 
Event of Files Shared Hypothesis 1 
1. Initial announcement 25.545 (0) Not supported 
2. Lawsuits ﬁled �12.023 (0) Supported 
3. Identity roadblock 9.204 (0) Supported 
4. John Doe lawsuits �30.451 (0) Supported 
Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values. 
TABLE 7 
Magnitude of Changes in Sharing Levels 
Change Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 
Increased by more than 1,000 ﬁles 3 1 11 0 
Increased by 501–1,000 ﬁles 24 10 52 0 
Increased by 101–500 ﬁles 545 147 485 8 
Increased by 1–100 ﬁles 918 554 511 124 
No change 267 220 356 632 
Decreased by 1–100 ﬁles 184 720 314 601 
Decreased by 101–500 ﬁles 96 363 285 613 
Decreased by 501–1,000 ﬁles 12 34 34 66 
Decreased by more than 1,000 ﬁles 7 7 8 12 
in Table 9 indicate that the number of sharers found at least once in the 4­
week period dropped steadily, except for an increase in the 4-week period 
after event 3. It is interesting to note that since the 4-week period prior to 
event 3, the average and median usage levels of sharers found online has 
increased. This suggests that while a number of sharers appear to have stopped 
using the ﬁle-sharing network, those who remained in the latter part of the 
legal action periods studied increased their frequency of usage. However, this 
increased frequency of usage did not reach the level that occurred before the 
RIAA initiated legal threats and actions. In the next section, we delve a bit 
deeper and present a comparative analysis of sharers differentiated by their 
levels of ﬁle sharing. 
B. Impact on Substantial and Nonsubstantial Sharers 
As part of its legal strategy, RIAA speciﬁcally targeted those who share 
“substantial amounts of copyrighted music” (RIAA 2003a). While RIAA did 
not ofﬁcially provide a clear deﬁnition of what constitutes “substantial,” at 
various points in its interaction with the media, references were made to 
numbers such as 800 and 1,000 ﬁles shared (CNN.com 2003; Van Buskirk 
2003; Lymann 2004). In this section, we compare and contrast the behavior 
of substantial sharers and nonsubstantial sharers. The results presented use 
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TABLE 8 
Number of Files Shared 
Average Median 
Pre event 1 342.82 227.0 
Post event 1 397.65 294.2 
Pre event 2 279.04 204.6 
Post event 2 238.03 177.8 
Pre event 3 168.29 89.0 
Post event 3 199.83 133.0 
Pre event 4 199.83 133.0 
Post event 4 93.25 10.5 
TABLE 9
 
Observed Frequency of Being Online before and after
 
Each of the Four Events
 
Number of Sharers 
Found Online at 
Least Once in 
Times Found Per Week 
4 Weeks Average Median 
Pre event 1 1,963 1.4335 1.50 
Post event 1 1,925 1.1974 1.25 
Pre event 2 1,842 1.0187 1.00 
Post event 2 1,704 .8120 .75 
Pre event 3 1,414 .6390 .50 
Post event 3 1,519 .6950 .50 
Pre event 4 1,519 .6950 .50 
Post event 4 1,060 .8432 .75 
Note.—Values for sharers found online at least once in each 4-week period 
are reported. 
800 ﬁles shared as the cutoff to demarcate substantial sharers. The results 
of our sensitivity analysis show that all the ﬁndings continue to hold in the 
range of 500–1,000 ﬁles shared. 
Tables 10 and 11 provide the results for sign and magnitude tests (detailed 
in the previous section) for nonsubstantial sharers. The results for nonsub­
stantial sharers are very similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 6 for the 
entire group studied. In fact, the test outcome pattern is identical. 
However, when we perform the tests on the data for substantial sharers 
(Tables 12 and 13), we observe several differences. The sign test results 
indicate that a signiﬁcant number of substantial sharers decreased their shar­
ing levels in response to event 1. Thus the proportion of sharers who de­
creased their sharing levels was substantially more than the proportion that 
increased their sharing levels. However, the overall magnitude of ﬁle-sharing 
levels did not decrease in response to event 1. Substantial sharers responded 
to event 3 by lowering both the sharing and the usage levels, despite the fact 
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TABLE 10 
Sign Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Nonsubstantial Sharers 
Z-Statistic for Z-Statistic for 
Number of Support for Frequency of Support for 
Event Files Shared Hypothesis 1 Being Online Hypothesis 2 
1. Initial announcement 28.568 (0) Not supported �17.121 (0) Supported 
2. Lawsuits ﬁled �18.684 (0) Supported �16.698 (0) Supported 
3. Identity roadblock 10.654 (0) Supported .829 (.2) Not Supported 
4. John Doe lawsuits �7.889 (0) Supported �8.9358 (0) Supported 
Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values. 
TABLE 11
 
Magnitude Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Nonsubstantial Sharers
 
Z-Statistic for Number Support for 
Event of Files Shared Hypothesis 1 
1. Initial announcement 26.794 (0) Not supported 
2. Lawsuits ﬁled �10.938 (0) Supported 
3. Identity roadblock 9.991 (0) Supported 
4. John Doe lawsuits �29.688 (0) Supported 
Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values. 
that this event represented a setback for RIAA. This behavior is markedly 
different from that of the nonsubstantial sharers. 
Note that the constitution of the substantial sharer group is temporally 
ﬂuid. A sharer who in a particular week shares over 800 music ﬁles may 
reduce his sharing levels in the subsequent weeks sufﬁciently to move into 
the nonsubstantial group. To obtain insights on these temporal dynamics, we 
segment the overall duration into ﬁve time epochs: before event 1, between 
events 1 and 2, between events 2 and 3, between events 3 and 4, after event 
4. Within each time epoch, we classify an individual sharer into the substantial 
group (denoted as S) if at any point in the time window 800 or more music 
ﬁles were shared by that individual. Otherwise, the individual is placed in 
the nonsubstantial group (denoted as N). With this segmentation, an indi­
vidual sharer could potentially take any one of 32 (25) possible paths. Figure 
1 displays the number of individuals in each path. For ease of exposition, 
only those paths followed by 10 or more individuals are shown. Table 14 
illustrates the average sharing levels and frequency of online usage along 
each of the shown paths. 
We note the following: 
1. While RIAA targeted the segment that shared a large number of ﬁles, 
the legal threats also appear quite effective against individuals whose initial 
ﬁle-sharing levels were low. An overwhelming majority of these individuals 
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TABLE 12 
Sign Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Substantial Sharers 
Z-Statistic for Z-Statistic for 
Number of Support for Frequency of Support for 
Event Files Shared Hypothesis 1 Being Online Hypothesis 2 
1. Initial announcement �1.651 (.049) Supported �2.4188 (.0078) Supported 
2. Lawsuits ﬁled �4.715 (0) Supported �4.7691 (0) Supported 
3. Ldentity roadblock �1.923 (.027) Not supported �3.6537 (.00013) Not Supported 
4. John Doe lawsuits �6.953 (0) Supported �5.3300 (0) Supported 
Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values. 
TABLE 13
 
Magnitude Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Substantial Sharers
 
Z-Statistic for Number Support for 
Event of Files Shared Hypothesis 1 
1. Initial 
announcement 1.395 (.0815) Not supported 
2. Lawsuits ﬁled �5.398 (0) Supported 
3. Identity roadblock �2.536 (.0056) Not supported 
4. John Doe lawsuits �7.048 (0) Supported 
Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values. 
not only stayed consistently below the threshold of 800, they further reduced 
the average number of ﬁles they shared by more than a third. 
2. The group that initially shared a substantial number of ﬁles displayed 
a staggered reaction to the legal threats. The largest segment of this group 
reduced their sharing levels after event 2; the second largest segment of this 
group reduced below the threshold after event 3. Together, by the end of the 
span of the four legal events, these two segments eliminated over 90 percent 
of the ﬁles they initially shared. There was, however, a small segment (11 
individuals) that appears to be undeterred by the RIAA threats and actions.6 
3. Note that with the exception of the 11-member S-S-S-S group, the 
frequency of usage was quite similar between the substantial and nonsub­
stantial groups, both before and after legal events. Of particular note, the 11­
member S-S-S-S group increased their usage levels after event 4. 
With the exception of one set of 11 individuals (the persistent S-S-S-S 
group), individuals exhibited behavior changes consistent with avoided being 
6 Consider the results reported in Figure 1. While there remain 11 “stubborn” substantial 
sharers, these may actually be non-U.S. sharers. Given the unlikely reach of U.S. legal sanctions 
to foreigners, one would expect foreign residents to largely ignore legal threats. There were 
initially 137 substantial sharers, but only 11 remained at the end of our study period. Put 
another way, some 92 percent of substantial sharers reduced their activity enough to fall into 
the nonsubstantial level. Thus, our results may understate the impact of the events on U.S. 
sharers. 
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Figure 1.—Substantial and nonsubstantial sharer dynamics 
targeted for suit by RIAA. By the end of the fourth event, all groups but the 
“stubborn 11” had reduced average number of ﬁles shared to 355 or fewer. 
In the next section we consider the changing music ﬁle-sharing landscape 
by looking from the perspective of a potential downloader. Have the RIAA 
actions effectively reduced opportunities to share? 
C. Overall Impact on Peer-to-Peer File-Downloading Opportunities 
Thus far, we presented our results based on our observations and analysis 
of 2,056 individual sharers. But consider a different perspective, that of an 
individual seeking to obtain music ﬁles for downloading. That is, consider 
how the individual sharer reactions collectively affect the overall availability 
of music ﬁles on a P2P network. In a sense, RIAA has chosen a strategy 
TABLE 14
 
Sharing Details for Each Path from Figure 1
 
Average Number of Files Shared Weekly Average Frequency of Being Online 
Between 1 Between 2 Between 3 Post Event Between 1 Between 2 Between 3 Post Event 
Path Pre Event 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 4 Pre Event 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 4 
NrNrNrNrN 256 312 210 157 71 1.4 1.3 .8 .5 .4 
NrSrNrNrN 619 879 457 278 127 1.5 1.3 .9 .6 .4 
NrSrSrSrN 585 941 1,054 1,049 307 1.1 1.5 .9 .5 .4 
SrSrNrNrN 1,432 1,626 426 291 123 1.3 1.3 .8 .4 .3 
SrSrSrNrN 1,223 1,319 1,190 253 114 1.2 1.2 .7 .6 .2 
SrSrSrSrN 1,292 1,432 1,311 1,137 355 1.5 1.2 .6 .6 .5 
SrSrSrSrS 1,414 1,474 1,291 1,411 1,168 1.3 1.6 .7 .4 1.0 
Note.—The ﬁve time epochs are before event 1 (before the initial announcement), between events 1 and 2 (between initial announcement and lawsuits ﬁled), between 
events 2 and 3 (between lawsuits ﬁled and identify roadblock), between events 3 and 4 (between identify roadblock and John Doe lawsuits), after event 4 (after John Doe 
lawsuits). 
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TABLE 15
 
Availability of Files per Album of Billboard Top 100 Albums
 
on Peer-to-Peer Network
 
Week of Average SD Low High 
March 17, 2003 487 401.96 123 1,682
 
March 15, 2004 351 370.86 33 1,245
 
that seems consistent with the “war on drugs.” Drug enforcement agencies 
have targeted the supply side (large suppliers and large shipments—sharers) 
rather than the demand side (users—downloaders). There are repeated stories 
of massive drug shipments seized and kingpins arrested, but drug usage 
continues. Drugs remain pervasive. What about the music availability for 
those who wish to download? We selected the top 20 best-selling albums on 
the Billboard chart during the reporting weeks of March 17, 2003 (before 
the legal events), and March 15, 2004 (after the events), and track the avail­
ability of music ﬁles associated with these top-selling albums. During each 
of these two 1-week periods, we performed a daily search on WinMx, another 
popular ﬁle-sharing network, to capture the number of individual music ﬁles 
associated with each of the top 20 albums. We selected WinMx instead of 
Kazaa for this analysis because Kazaa returns no more than 200 results in 
response to a search query for a music ﬁle, while WinMx has no such 
restrictions. (It is important to note that Kazaa has no limitation on individual 
sharer searches that we analyzed in the previous sections.) WinMx continually 
searches for the selected music ﬁle until the searcher terminates the search. 
As shown in Table 15, although the average number of ﬁles available from 
each search (each album) decreased by almost 30 percent, a search for music 
ﬁles associated with these popular albums still returns more than 300 indi­
vidual ﬁles available for download. Even though RIAA threats and legal 
actions appear to have had some success in reducing the total number of 
music ﬁles available on P2P networks, there remained at least 33 copies (and 
up to 1,300) of items on each of the Billboard top 100 albums. 
Given the results observed in earlier subsections, it would seem that RIAA 
actions did affect the sharing behavior of individuals. There is indication that 
the average number of ﬁles shared declined, at least by event 4, across almost 
all sharers. Still, for any individual wanting to download, there remain quite 
a few options. The RIAA may have succeeded more in reducing the average 
availability of ﬁles than in reducing piracy. If Grokster’s and Kazaa’s state­
ments are correct and P2P trafﬁc quickly bounced back after legal threats 
and actions, then it may simply be that individuals are not downloading less 
but are sharing less (that is, making fewer of their music ﬁles shared or 
accessible for downloading). 
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VI. Conclusion 
Our research question centered on illegal music sharing and involved the 
analysis of how individuals actually responded to legal threats from the 
recording industry. By developing an automated process, we were able to 
track the sharing behavior of 2,056 individuals before and after four RIAA-
related events. That is, our analysis utilized microlevel data tracked across 
time. Three of the events were RIAA’s formal threat that they would be 
pursuing legal action, the announcement that initial suits had been ﬁled, and 
the announcement that a second round of suits had been ﬁled. The other 
event involved an appellate court ruling that RIAA could not subpoena certain 
sharer identifying information from Internet service providers. 
Our analysis indicates mixed success for RIAA’s strategy. On the positive 
side, before- and after-event comparisons suggest that over the course of the 
four events, the majority of substantial sharers decreased the number of ﬁles 
shared, typically by more than 90 percent. During this period, a majority of 
nonsubstantial sharers reduced sharing activity, typically to a third of their 
original levels. Further, a substantial number of sharers exhibited some risk 
mitigation behavior. On the other hand, some ﬁndings pose concern for the 
recording industry. We found an upsurge in the frequency of usage after 
event 3 from the sharers who continue to use the ﬁle-sharing network. These 
individuals are continuing to ﬁnd value in accessing and using P2P networks. 
Next, although our analysis identiﬁed RIAA-intended behavioral changes 
following RIAA’s legal threats and legal actions, there remain fairly wide 
downloading options. That is, after the four events, we still found a fairly 
wide choice for anyone seeking to download music ﬁles. Another cause for 
concern is that even if the individual behavioral changes we observed are 
linked to an actual lessening of piracy, there is still the fact that the legal 
action did not come without a price to RIAA itself. Many critics of RIAA’s 
actions against individual consumers suggested that its legal efforts may be 
perceived as heavy-handed and could create a backlash on the music industry 
itself (Graham 2003; Ahrens 2003). The New York Daily News also reported 
a potential public backlash as it featured on its front-page headline a 12­
year-old child named as defendant in an RIAA lawsuit (Sangha and Furman 
2003). Shell (2003) pointed out that in dealing with music piracy, the music 
industry’s legal success in suing its own potential customers may not be as 
important as its potential future success in adjusting its business strategy 
(Byrne 2003; Evans 2002). There are various signs of experiments with new 
strategies, as recently evidenced from new licensing options that allow sharers 
rights to freely share the music (Bhattacharjee et al. 2006; Smith 2004). 
While our results are consistent with the effect intended by RIAA, we feel 
it necessary to add the following caveat. It is possible that the observed 
reduction in ﬁle sharing on Kazaa may have been at least partially linked to 
a shift by sharers to other sharing networks. While we cannot rule this out, 
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we do have information from another sharing network (WinMx), which is 
noted in Section VC. As described above, we found a similar general down­
ward trend in the P2P ﬁle-downloading opportunities, which suggests that 
there was no large-scale shift in usage from Kazaa (the largest sharing net­
work during our observation period) to WinMX (the second largest sharing 
network during our observation period). Finally, we found no reported sharp 
increase in the usage of smaller networks in the popular press. 
Taken as a whole, our results lead us to posit that individuals have, to a 
very large extent, responded in the direction intended by RIAA. In fact, the 
effect on U.S. sharers may be stronger than our numerical results indicate 
because the few (11) who remained as stubborn sharers may well be foreign-
based sharers (see note 6). However we also note that a signiﬁcant number 
of sharers tended to move below the threat levels (800 or 1,000 ﬁles shared) 
rather than exit from sharing activity. The RIAA could lower the threat level 
or the number of ﬁles shared at which an individual sharer might be pursued. 
But lawsuits cost real money. How many suits is it reasonable for RIAA to 
pursue? At the present time, what we can say is that the previously substantial 
sharers are tending to still actively share (albeit fewer ﬁles), and downloading 
options still abound for those seeking to download. We continue to track and 
monitor while we watch for the development by the recording industry of 
market mechanisms that might be more effective—will market options 
emerge that do not require costly legal actions and yet both enhance industry 
net revenue while lowering the cost of music to consumers? 
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